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MISSED OPPORTUNITIES: 
A POSTMORTEM ON CANADA’S 
EXPERIENCE WITH THE CONDITIONAL 
SENTENCE 
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Our lives are defined by opportunities, even the ones we miss. 
- F. Scott Fitzgerald 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
As with most things in life, context matters when examining criminal justice 
policy. Canada’s conditional sentence of imprisonment is no exception. 
Introduced in 1996, it was a reflection of the time. Figure 1 begins our story. 
 
 
Copyright © 2019 by Cheryl Marie Webster & Anthony N. Doob.  
This article is also available online at http://lcp.law.duke.edu/ 
*  Cheryl Marie Webster is a Full Professor of Criminology at the University of Ottawa. Anthony Doob 
is a Professor Emeritus of Criminology at the University of Toronto. The writing of this paper was 
supported by a Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada grant to Cheryl Marie 
Webster. We wish to thank an anonymous reviewer for various detailed comments including an analysis 
which led to part of the title and a broadened final discussion of this paper.  
163 - WEBSTER DOOB - MISSED OPPORTUNITIES (DO NOT DELETE) 2/28/2019  2:27 PM 
164 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 82:163 
Figure 1: Imprisonment Rates: US and Canada1 
 
While the dramatic increase in America’s imprisonment (particularly 
contrasted with Canadian trends) is now known well beyond those studying 
sentencing patterns and trends, less known are the similarities between Canada 
and the United States in the early 1970s. At that point in criminal justice history, 
Canada had enjoyed a relatively stable incarceration rate for at least two decades 
(if not since the late nineteenth century).2 Similarly, the American imprisonment 
rate had shown relative stability for many decades, though the rate (per 100,000 
residents) was likely about 50% higher than that of Canada.3 
More importantly for our current purposes, both countries witnessed growth 
in their imprisonment rates starting in the mid-1970s. The reasons for these 
increases—as well as the responses—were almost certainly different in the two 
nations. For Canadians, this expansion in the use of incarceration was seen as a 
cause for concern. As we have written about elsewhere,4 Canada never 
 
 1.  Data for this figure, as well as all other figures and tables in this paper, come from: STATISTICS 
CANADA, CANADIAN SOCIO-ECONOMIC INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (CANSIM) (2018), 
https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/en/type/data?subject_levels=35 [https://perma.cc/2JC5-JLWU] 
[hereinafter CANSIM]. 
 2.  GOV’T OF CANADA, THE CRIMINAL LAW IN CANADIAN SOCIETY (1982). This important policy 
statement includes data suggesting that Canada’s imprisonment rate between 1890 and 1950 ranged from 
roughly 82 to 110 per 100,000 total population. These rates are consistent with Canadian data after 1950. 
 3.  Data for U.S. jails are not reliably available prior to 1980. We have estimated jail populations 
based on the proportion of the total population that was in jails (as opposed to prisons) after 1980. 
 4.  Cheryl M. Webster & Anthony N. Doob, Penal Optimism: Understanding American Mass 
Imprisonment from a Canadian Perspective, in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM IN CRIME AND 
PUNISHMENT 121 (Kevin Reitz ed., 2018). 
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consistently or enthusiastically endorsed a “high imprisonment for crime 
reduction” policy. From the early twentieth century onwards, numerous 
Canadian reports concluded that prisons accomplished little, if anything, in 
reducing or controlling crime. Imprisonment was seen as necessary for some of 
those found guilty. However, report after report suggested that prison should be 
used with restraint and that Canada incarcerated too many people.5 
Unsurprisingly, calls for measures to reduce rising imprisonment levels were 
heard. In Canada, the federal government has responsibility for the criminal law. 
Hence, unlike the United States and Australia, there is a uniform criminal law 
across the country; however, the administration of criminal justice is largely 
governed by provincial and territorial governments. More importantly, the 
responsibility for imprisonment is split between the federal and provincial (or 
territorial) governments. Specifically, prisoners in pretrial detention held on 
remand and those sentenced to less than two years are the responsibility of the 
provinces and territories, while those sentenced to two years or more are the 
responsibility of the federal government. The importance of this distinction is 
shown in Figure 2.   
 
 5.  For an incomplete list, see Cheryl M. Webster & Anthony N. Doob, Maintaining Our Balance: 
Trends in Imprisonment Policies in Canada, in CANADIAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY (Karim Ismaili 
et al. eds., 2012). 
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Figure 2: Federal and Provincial Imprisonment Rates (Canada) per 100,000 
Residents6 
 
Between 1974 and 1994, Canada’s overall imprisonment rate went from 81 to 
116 prisoners per 100,000 residents, an increase of 43%. On an international 
scale, this increase may appear trivial compared to the U.S. increase during the 
same period—rising from 155 to 564 prisoners per 100,000 residents, a 264% 
increase. On a national scale, though, it was disconcerting for those responsible 
for imprisonment. Government officials at the provincial and territorial level of 
government were particularly alarmed by rising U.S. prison populations, 
genuinely concerned with their ability to cope in the case that Canada continued 
to follow America’s lead.7 
For Canada’s provincial and territorial heads of corrections, rates were largely 
irrelevant. Rather, numbers counted. And the increase over this period was non-
trivial. In 1974, provincial prisons housed an average of 9978 prisoners.8 Twenty 
years later, this number had risen to 19,812 —an increase of 99%. Much of this 
increase was simply because Canada’s population had grown. But from a 
correctional perspective, whether the increase was due to population increases or 
 
 6.  CANSIM, supra note 1. 
 7.  Cheryl M. Webster & Anthony N. Doob, Punitive Trends and Stable Imprisonment Rates in 
Canada, in 36 CRIME AND JUSTICE 297, 333 (Michael Tonry ed., 2007). 
 8.  CANSIM, supra note 1. 
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a more punitive justice system was irrelevant. Either way, additional capacity was 
needed.9 
Nonetheless, nothing happened quickly. In quintessential Canadian fashion, 
multiple commissions and committees spent the next several decades examining 
the role that criminal law generally and imprisonment in particular should play 
in Canada’s response to crime and criminals.10 As part of the continued 
reaffirmation of the need for restraint in the use of imprisonment, repeated 
recommendations were proposed for greater use of alternatives to prison, with 
an emphasis on community sanctions.11 However, it was not until 1990 that the 
federal (Conservative) government released a set of policy papers12 on sentencing 
and corrections and shortly thereafter tabled a sentencing bill. Unsurprisingly, 
both endorsed restraint in the recourse to custody.  More notably for our current 
purposes though, the policy paper urged the development of intermediate 
sanctions. It noted, amongst other things, that 
We share the concern that Canada relies heavily on incarceration as a sanction . . . . 
Imprisonment is not the most effective punishment for most crime. Custodial sanctions 
have been of particular concern respecting aboriginal people. Greater use of 
intermediate sanctions offers greater opportunity to engage the aboriginal communities 
in the solution of common problems.13 
Although the Conservative government’s 1990 legislative proposal was not 
passed before the 1993 election, the incoming Liberal government introduced its 
own sentencing bill in 1994.14 It included a new conditional sentence of 
imprisonment.15 Passed in 1996 as part of a package of statutory reforms to the 
Canadian sentencing process, this new criminal sanction constituted a direct 
attempt to respond to provincial and territorial concerns with their incarceration 
levels. Specifically, the conditional sentence is a sentence of imprisonment of less 
than two years—and, as such, falling under provincial, not federal, correctional 
 
 9.  A perceptive reader might correctly note that if the 1964 overall rate (105 people per 100,000 
population) was taken as the base rate, the increase would be much more modest. However, the metric 
most relevant to those running prisons is the total number of prisoners rather than the rate of 
incarceration. Even using the year 1964 as the starting point, the average number of prisoners in 
provincial and territorial prisons was 12,559. This value decreased between 1964 and 1974, but by 1977 
had exceeded even its 1964 number. By 1994, there were, on average, 19,812 prisoners in provincial and 
territorial prisons—an increase of 58% since 1964.  
 10.  Webster & Doob, supra note 7. 
 11.  Importantly, the contribution made by the increase in the remand population (see Figure 3 and 
section IV(A) of this paper) was largely ignored in this discussion, in large part because it went unnoticed. 
Remand prisoners constituted 14% of the total prison population in 1978 (the first year in which data are 
available) and 16% in 1994. 
 12.  SOLICITOR GENERAL OF CANADA, DIRECTIONS FOR REFORM: SENTENCING (1990); 
SOLICITOR GENERAL OF CANADA, A FRAMEWORK FOR SENTENCING, CORRECTIONS AND 
CONDITIONAL RELEASE (1990); SOLICITOR GENERAL OF CANADA, CORRECTIONS AND 
CONDITIONAL RELEASE (1990). 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  35th Parliament, 1st Session, Bill C-41 (1996), http://www.parl.ca/DocumentViewer/en/35-
1/bill/C-41/royal-assent [https://perma.cc/L5YP-775S]. 
 15.  Hereinafter denoted by its more common diminutive: the conditional sentence. 
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jurisdiction—that the sentencing judge permits the prisoner to serve in the 
community contingent on various statutory and court-ordered conditions. 
In its early years, this new sanction was heralded as a success. Empirical 
examinations suggested that its introduction was associated with a significant 
drop in the number of admissions to custody, without being accompanied by a 
large degree of net-widening.16 Consequently, it was promoted as a potential 
model for other jurisdictions. In brief, this criminal sanction held significant 
promise for nations like Canada that were searching for effective strategies to 
limit or reduce growing incarceration rates. 
This paper proposes to revisit the conditional sentence. With the benefit of 
over twenty years of practice since its introduction, we are well-situated to tell 
the longer-term story of this sanction, contextualized within a broader set of 
political and judicial events and decisions, as well as informed by more extensive 
longitudinal data. Within this larger framework, we would suggest that despite 
multiple attempts to fulfill early expectations and promises, the conditional 
sentence in Canada has largely failed to deliver. To this end, we begin—in Part 
II—by discussing the various challenges that the conditional sentence has faced 
in gaining legitimacy with both the Canadian public and the judiciary. Part III 
examines its vulnerability to penal populism under the most recent Conservative 
government (2006–2015) that likely was enabled by the public’s mistrust of this 
sanction. Part IV examines the empirical data that might speak to its success (or 
lack thereof) in bringing about reductions in the use of imprisonment. We 
conclude—in Part V—with a discussion of several lessons that the Canadian 
experience might provide for other jurisdictions looking to decarcerate. As part 
of this wider conversation, potentially unforeseen consequences of this sanction 
are explored. In particular, we suggest that although its addition to the list of 
available sanctions may have had little impact, the subsequent reduced 
availability of conditional sentencing may have created several 
counterproductive outcomes. 
II 
THE ELUSIVE SEARCH FOR LEGITIMACY 
To say that the conditional sentence began its life on rocky footing would be 
an understatement. In fact, one scholar suggested this sentencing reform was 
largely doomed to fail from the start.17 Without necessarily disagreeing with this 
fatalistic position, we argue that it faced repeated challenges to its legitimacy 
almost immediately after its enactment that were never fully overcome. 
 
 16.  Julian V. Roberts, The Evolution of Conditional Sentencing, 3 CRIM. REV. 267 (2002); Julian V. 
Roberts & T. Gabor, The Impact of Conditional Sentencing, 8 CANADIAN CRIM. L. REV. 33 (June 2003); 
Julian V. Roberts & T. Gabor, Living in the Shadow of Prison, 44 BRITISH J. CRIMINOLOGY 92 (2004); 
JULIAN V. ROBERTS, THE VIRTUAL PRISON (Cambridge University Press 2004). 
 17.  Dawn North, Conditional Sentencing At The Crossroads (May 25, 2018) (unpublished Ph.D. 
Prospectus, Simon Fraser University) (on file with authors).   
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A. Badly Drafted Legislation 
From the start, the legislation setting out the conditional sentence constituted 
a poorly drafted set of provisions for Canada’s Criminal Code.18 It was part of a 
long bill—roughly seventy-five pages in length—that, for the first time, crafted 
both a statement of purposes and principles as well as attempted to create a single 
coherent section in the Criminal Code that addressed all aspects of sentencing.19 
Attention appeared to be less focused on the conditional sentence than on other, 
more central, sentencing components. Symptomatically, a senior Justice official 
described this new sanction as a drafting “afterthought” to expand non-custodial 
alternatives.20 
Additionally, the federal government was under significant pressure to bring 
about decarceration. Simultaneous to Parliamentary discussions of the new 
sentencing bill, a federal-provincial-territorial committee was established in 1995 
“to identify options to deal effectively with growing prison populations.”21 
Underlining broad concerns about runaway prison population growth, there was 
uniform agreement that urgent solutions were needed. The ’committee’s 
recommendations received unanimous support. Ironically, incarceration rates 
actually peaked in 1994 (Figure 2). However, no one would have known in 1995 
that they were about to decline. Consequently, the report stated—in bold print 
and consistent with thinking at the time—that 
[i]n determining the most appropriate use of incarceration, a clear distinction should be 
made between violent and non-violent offenders. It is recommended that all 
jurisdictions vigorously pursue community-based alternatives to imprisonment that will 
provide the best short and long term contribution to public safety.22 
Compounding the deficiencies in the initial drafting of the sections of the bill 
setting out the conditional sentence, this intermediate sanction received very 
little attention during the Parliamentary process. This lack of serious debate is 
largely rooted in the rather bizarre and unexpected focus of Parliament on 
another, largely irrelevant section of the bill. The proposed law contained a 
provision that read: “Evidence that the offence was motivated by bias, prejudice 
or hate based on the race, nationality, colour, religion, sex, age, mental or physical 
disability or sexual orientation of the victim . . . shall be deemed to be aggravating 
circumstances.”23 With agreement from some Liberals, the right wing Reform 
Party (having split from, and almost completely decimated the former 
Progressive Conservative party) treated the inclusion of “sexual orientation” as 
if it had been written to overtly condone homosexuality at the cost of Christian 
 
 18.  Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 (Can.). 
 19.  An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Sentencing) and Other Acts in Consequence Thereof, 
R.S.C. 1995, c. C-41, s. 742 (Can.) [hereinafter Bill C-41]. 
 20.  North, supra note 17, at 7.  
 21.  MINISTRY OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, CORRECTIONS POPULATION GROWTH, REPORT FOR 
FEDERAL/PROVINCIAL/TERRITORIAL MINISTERS RESPONSIBLE FOR JUSTICE (Aug. 1996). 
 22.  MINISTRY OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, CORRECTIONS POPULATION GROWTH, REPORT FOR 
FEDERAL/PROVINCIAL/TERRITORIAL MINISTERS RESPONSIBLE FOR JUSTICE (May 1996) (Can.). 
 23.  Bill C-41, supra note 19, s. 718.2(a)(i). 
163 - WEBSTER DOOB - MISSED OPPORTUNITIES (DO NOT DELETE) 2/28/2019  2:27 PM 
170 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 82:163 
values.24 As the Minister of Justice responsible for the bill described to us in an 
interview about twenty years later, 
[t]he one thing that preoccupied the House of Commons and the public for six months 
before [the bill] got passed . . . was the appearance of two words “sexual orientation” in 
the hate crimes provision . . . . Those boneheads didn’t spend a moment talking about 
the policy of conditional sentences, didn’t talk even about the . . . provisions for 
recognizing the [special] circumstances of Aboriginal [people in sentencing] which I 
thought was daring at the time.  I expected to have the roof fall in on me over that. They 
focused on those two words. 
The result was that nobody apparently examined the legislation carefully. 
Unsurprisingly, it was necessary to amend the new law soon after the bill received 
royal assent.25 As part of the aptly entitled “Criminal Law Improvement Act, 
1996,” judges were thereafter required to be satisfied not only that the sentence 
would not endanger the safety of the community but that it “would be consistent 
with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing set out [in specific 
Criminal Code sections],” presumably to emphasize proportionality.26 More 
amendments quickly followed. 
Arguably the most remarkable revision addressed an oversight in the original 
legislation pertaining to persons serving a conditional sentence who 
disappeared—for example, those who moved to another part of Canada and did 
not advertise that they were no longer in compliance with their conditional 
sentence order—and were not found until after the conditional sentence expired. 
According to the original law, these offenders would be deemed, by default, to 
have served the full conditional sentence. In other words, as long as one was not 
caught, the clock kept ticking until the original end date of the conditional 
sentence had been reached. 
In response, a provision was added in 1999 that suspended the running of the 
conditional sentence as soon as a warrant was issued or the offender had been 
arrested or otherwise compelled to appear in court.27 While other amendments 
were somewhat less embarrassing and often required only minor word changes, 
 
 24.  Reflecting the Reform Party’s concerns, Roseanne Skokes (a Liberal MP from Nova Scotia) 
stated in debate at second reading of the bill that despite liking most of it, “. . . I wish to go on record 
today as taking exception to the specific inclusion of the wording of “sexual orientation” in the Criminal 
Code amendment. The inclusion of this wording in effect gives special rights, special consideration, to 
homosexuals. The reference to sexual orientation in the code and its proposed inclusion in the human 
rights legislation gives recognition to a faction in our society which is undermining and destroying our 
Canadian values and Christian morality. Such a special recognition of sexual orientation in our federal 
legislation is an overt condonation of the practice of homosexuality which is being imposed on Canadians. 
It has the effect of legislating a morality that is not supported by our Canadian and Christian morals and 
values. Canadians do not have to accept homosexuality as being natural and moral. Homosexuality is not 
natural, it is immoral and it is undermining the inherent rights and values of our Canadian families and 
it must not and should not be condoned.” 133 HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATES 093, 1st Session, 35th 
Parliament (Sept. 20, 1994), at 1610 [Can.]. 
 25.  David Cole & Melvyn Green, M. Kleiman, When Brute Force Fails: How to Have Less Crime 
and Less Punishment, PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y, no. 3 (2012), at 368–72 (book review). 
 26.  Criminal Law Improvement Act, R.S.C. 1996, c. C-17 (Can.). 
 27.  An Act to Amend the Criminal Code, the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and the 
Corrections and Conditional Release Act, R.S.C. 1996, c. C-51 (Can.). 
163 - WEBSTER DOOB - MISSED OPPORTUNITIES (DO NOT DELETE) 2/28/2019  2:27 PM 
No. 1 2019] MISSED OPPORTUNITIES 171 
the damage had likely already been done. The need for multiple and immediate 
revisions almost certainly undermined this sanction’s credibility, and by 
extension, its legitimacy in the eyes of Canadians. 
B. Legislating an Apparent Contradiction in Terms 
Even after legislative corrections, the conditional sentence continued to face 
significant challenges. Most obviously, the name—Conditional Sentence of 
Imprisonment—was almost certainly a serious mistake. This designation derived 
from the original description of its availability: 
Where a person is convicted of an offence, except an offence that is punishable by a 
minimum term of imprisonment, and the court 
a) imposes a sentence of imprisonment of less than two years, and 
b) is satisfied that serving the sentence in the community would not endanger the 
safety of the community, 
the court may . . . order that the offender serve the sentence in the community, subject 
to the offender’s complying with conditions of a conditional sentence order made under 
742.3.28 
Said differently, it was designed to be a “Sentence of Imprisonment” that was 
not served in a prison. The fact that members of the public were much more likely 
to find it to be an acceptable sentence if its punitive conditions were made 
salient29 was irrelevant. It was still a prison sentence without prison. This 
contradiction only served to further undermine its legitimacy. 
The purpose of the sanction was unambiguous from the start: to reduce the 
use of imprisonment. That it was to be a substitute for real prison sentences of 
less than two years was understandable as it was provincial prison populations 
that were growing too quickly (see Figure 2). Importantly, the two-year-less-a-
day limit on conditional sentences signalled that it was not designed to be a 
substitute for prison sentences for very serious cases. Nonetheless, for many 
Canadians, emphasizing the possibility of handing down what ultimately 
amounted to non-custodial sentences for serious or violent offenses (e.g., 
robbery, sexual assault and manslaughter) under the illusion that they were 
prison sentences was seen as a “get out of jail free” card. 
The word “conditional” didn’t help. It presumably meant that freedom was 
conditional and offenders violating release conditions could quickly be 
imprisoned. Although accurate on paper, this interpretation has not necessarily 
corresponded to actual practice in Canada. Rather, breaches of conditions were 
often met with modifications (such as different conditions or an increase in 
conditions) rather than an immediate committal to custody for the duration of 
the order,30 further reaffirming the public’s perception of the sanction as 
unacceptably lenient. 
 
 28.  Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 742.1 (Can.). 
 29.  Julian V. Roberts, Dan Antonowicz, & Trevor Sanders, Conditional Sentences of Imprisonment: 
An Empirical Analysis of Optional Conditions, 30 C.R. (5th) 113 (2000). 
 30.  ROBERTS, THE VIRTUAL PRISON, supra note 16. 
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In fact, this view was reinforced by a comparison of the consequences of 
breaching a conditional sentence to the consequences attached to a “suspended 
sentence and probation”—a community sanction that had existed for many 
decades.31 The legislation governing conditional sentences was almost certainly 
written with the goal of making breaches of a condition more likely to result in 
imprisonment than breaches of probation, even though other options, such as 
taking no action, are possible in the case of the conditional sentence. 
Notwithstanding this intention, a person who breached a probation order (a 
criminal offense in Canada) could easily be arrested, detained until trial, and 
subsequently receive a custodial sanction of up to four years in prison—an 
impossibility with a conditional sentence. 
C. Lacking a Punitive Bite 
One could easily argue that conditional sentences as initially legislated were 
insufficiently punitive to justify being used in place of custodial sanctions. This 
conclusion is rooted in two provisions. First, any normal reading of the legislation 
would suggest that a judge’s decision to impose a conditional sentence was to be 
made in two steps: the judge imposes a term of imprisonment of a fixed duration, 
and then, separately, determines whether this prison term should be served in the 
community. This two-stage process produces a “penological paradox.” As 
Gemmell explains: 
[T]he judge must first determine that imprisonment is the only reasonable sanction in 
the circumstances then decide whether the offender should nevertheless serve that 
sentence in the community.  The decision to impose a conditional sentence is almost a 
kind of reductio ad absurdum of the original decision that called for imprisonment.32 
It would not be difficult to imagine that most Canadians would question—if 
not outright reject—the notion of punitive equivalence of a custodial and non-
custodial sanction. 
Second, there was nothing in the original legislation governing conditional 
sentences that even hinted at a requirement that punitive conditions be imposed, 
although § 718.1 of the same piece of legislation stated clearly that “[a] sentence 
must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of 
responsibility of the offender.”33 There is reason to believe that judges were often 
creative in constructing punitive or restrictive conditions (such as house arrest). 
However, these conditions were not, initially, discussed in the legislation. As time 
went on, the conditional sentence would sometimes be referred to in the public 
press as “house arrest,” but the paradox persisted. 
Taken together, the assumption underlying both of these provisions that a 
conditional sentence could be crafted to be equally punitive as a prison sentence 
of the same length constituted a lethal blow to the initial legitimacy of the 
conditional sentence. Importantly, the government never made a serious attempt 
 
 31.  Jack Gemmell, The New Conditional Sentencing Regime, 39 CRIM. L.Q. 334 (1997). 
 32.  Id. at 337. 
 33.  Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 718.1 (Can.). 
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to educate the public or train judges (or, for that matter, anyone else in the 
criminal justice system) regarding the correct interpretation of the sanction’s 
legislative provisions. Nor did it explain the appropriate ways to implement the 
conditional sentence. Equally relevant, the legislation is effectively silent on the 
offenses for which it might be used. As two senior Ontario judges who were 
hearing criminal cases at this time remarked a few years ago, “by dint of 
circumstances rather than design, only a token effort was made to ‘pre-sell’ this 
substantial reform to Canadian opinion-makers, the judiciary, the police and the 
media.”34 
Not surprisingly, judges—like Canadians generally—were not enamoured 
with the value of this criminal sanction. Fifty-five percent of Canada’s trial judges 
reported on a 1998 survey that they had handed down ten or fewer conditional 
sentences since they had become available.35 Notably, those judges who did not 
use it were considerably less likely to report that it was as effective as a normal 
prison sentence for accomplishing proportionality or any of the standard 
purposes of sentences. Further, those who infrequently used this sanction also 
did not believe that conditional sentence orders were adequately enforced. 
Equally important, most (83%) of Canada’s judges thought that few, if any, of 
the public understood the nature of this sanction.36 Indeed, only 55% of judges 
thought that more than a few members of the public who were aware of the 
nature of conditional sentences supported their use.37 Even more telling, only 
20% reported that they never considered “the impact that a conditional order 
might have on public opinion.”38 Indeed, judges knew, soon after the sanction 
was legislated, that it could undermine public confidence in sentencing. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Supreme Court of Canada intervened in 2000, 
handing down a decision39 in what—we suspect—was a valiant attempt to save 
the conditional sentence so that it could be used to reduce imprisonment. In fact, 
this court quoted itself from a previous case, noting that: 
Canada’s incarceration rate . . . places it second or third highest among industrialized 
democracies . . . [and] that incarceration is costly, frequently unduly harsh and 
ineffective, not only in relation to its purported rehabilitative goals, but also in relation 
to its broader public goals . . . . The 1996 sentencing reforms . . . must be understood as 
a reaction to the overuse of prison as a sanction and must accordingly be given 
appropriate force as remedial provisions.40 
To this end, Canada’s Supreme Court gave a benevolent interpretation in R. 
v. Proulx of how the duration of the conditional sentence should be determined 
and clarified that it required punitive conditions. Specifically, the Court 
 
 34.  Cole & Green, supra note 25, at 369. 
 35.  JULIAN V. ROBERTS, ANTHONY N. DOOB, & VOULA MARINOS, JUDICIAL ATTITUDES TO 
CONDITIONAL TERMS OF IMPRISONMENT: RESULTS OF A NATIONAL SURVEY 4 (2000). 
 36.  Id. at 18. 
 37.  Id. at 19 
 38.  Id. at 21. 
 39.  R. v. Proulx, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61 (Can.). 
 40.  Id. at 16.  
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substituted a “purposive” interpretation rather than one based on what was 
written in the legislation.41 That is, the rigid two-step decision-making process 
was abandoned and judges were thereafter allowed, if not encouraged, to hand 
down conditional sentences that were longer than the terms of incarceration that 
they were meant to replace.42 Further, the Court distinguished the “suspended 
sentence and probation” from the conditional sentence in terms of their 
sentencing objectives.43 While the former was intended primarily to serve 
rehabilitative goals, the latter was to fulfill both rehabilitative and deterrent or 
denunciatory goals.44 As such, the Supreme Court suggested that onerous and 
punitive conditions—including house arrest and curfews—should be the norm.45 
Further, it stressed that there should be a presumption of incarceration in cases 
of proven breach. Notably though, the Supreme Court of Canada decided not to 
restrict judicial discretion in terms of eligible offenses. Rather, it confirmed that 
this sanction was available for any offense that satisfies the minimal statutory 
requirements.46 
Although this decision attempted to address several of the initial problems in 
the legislation governing conditional sentences,47 we believe that the sanction 
remained irrevocably tainted. Confidence in the law governing it and its 
perceived legitimacy were undermined from the start, and despite Supreme 
Court intervention, likely never fully recuperated. While sentencing judges were 
henceforward equipped with at least some guidance, skepticism persisted 
regarding other more practical challenges. Notably, sufficient monitoring and 
enforcement of the conditions handed down as part of the sanction were not 
guaranteed.48 
More importantly, there is little reason to believe that public opinion 
surrounding the conditional sentence improved. Even during this sanction’s 
honeymoon phase shortly after coming into force, a survey of Ontario residents 
found that the public—when a conditional sentence was described to them in 
detail—did not differentiate it very well from a sentence involving ordinary 
probation.49 Further, there was already evidence suggesting that public support 
for its use varied substantially with the offense. While approximately 71% of 
respondents indicated that they probably or definitely preferred this sanction for 
assault causing bodily harm, only 44% probably or definitely favored it for a 
 
 41.  Id. at 55–62. 
 42.  Id. at 51–54. 
 43.  Id. at 55–57. 
 44.  Id. at 41, 67, 80. 
 45.  Id. at 32, 103. 
 46.  Id. at 127. 
 47.  Allan Manson, The Conditional Sentence: A Canadian Approach to Sentencing Reform or Doing 
the Time Warp Again, 44 CRIM. L.Q. 375 (2001). 
 48.  Julian V. Roberts, Cathy Hutchison & Rebecca Jesseman, Supervising Conditional Sentence 
Orders: The Perceptions and Experiences of Probation Officers in Ontario, 29 C.R. (6th) 107 (2005). 
 49.  Voula Marinos & Anthony N. Doob, Understanding Public Attitudes Toward Conditional 
Sentences of Imprisonment, 21 C.R. (5th) 31 (1999).  
163 - WEBSTER DOOB - MISSED OPPORTUNITIES (DO NOT DELETE) 2/28/2019  2:27 PM 
No. 1 2019] MISSED OPPORTUNITIES 175 
series of break-and-enters and even fewer (40%) preferred this option for sexual 
assault.50 A critical point about this survey is that the conditional sentence was 
described to respondents in ideal circumstances—including house arrest except 
for employment purposes—and respondents were told that offenders who 
violated any condition would serve the rest of the sentence in prison.51 It is likely 
that most Canadians, who had not been prompted with this description of the 
sanction, perceived the conditional sentence in considerably more lenient terms. 
Further, they would almost certainly have been unaware of the Supreme Court’s 
emphasis on punitive measures. 
III 
FALLING PREY TO PENAL POPULISM 
The conditional sentence was clearly in trouble. Skepticism, if not outright 
mistrust, was mounting, particularly amongst the public. Unsurprisingly, this 
sanction was especially vulnerable to political manipulation. In preparing the 
material for their 2000 federal election platform, the federal Conservative party 
targeted the sanction with a promise that “[a] Progressive Conservative 
government would eliminate the option of conditional sentences for certain 
scheduled offences (crimes involving sex or violence).”52 The Canadian Alliance 
party53 was equally clear when it asserted that: 
Canadians are tired of a criminal justice system that says one thing, then does another.  
Some sentences may sound tough, but are undermined by introducing concurrent 
sentences, conditional sentences, suspended sentences, or parole after as little as one-
sixth of sentence served.  Canadians need to have confidence that our judicial system 
will keep criminals off our streets. 
A Canadian Alliance government will crack down on career criminals through such 
measures as: 
• Eliminating conditional sentences for violent offenders 
• Requiring lifetime supervision for repeat violent or sexual offenders 
• Automatic dangerous offender status for a third violent or sexual offence 
• Consecutive rather than concurrent sentences for multiple violent offences.54 
 
 50.  Id. at 3. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATIVE PARTY OF CANADA, CHANGE YOU CAN TRUST: THE 
PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATIVE PLAN FOR CANADA’S FUTURE 21(2000).  
 53.  The Canadian Alliance was essentially the right-wing Reform Party that had split off from the 
Conservative Party prior to the 1993 election. It subsequently reunited with the Conservatives to form 
the Conservative Party of Canada (in power 2006–2015). 
 54.  CANADIAN ALLIANCE, A TIME FOR CHANGE: AN AGENDA OF RESPECT FOR ALL 
CANADIANS 18 (2000), https://www.poltext.org/sites/poltext.org/files/plateformes/can2000all_ 
plt_en._14112008_173717.pdf [https://perma.cc/FZ62-8B8J].  Symptomatically, these political promises 
were presented under the sub-heading “Truth-In-Sentencing”—itself under the heading “Making Our 
Communities Safe” in a sub-section entitled “Our Justice System has Become Unjust” that was contained 
in a section entitled “Safer Communities, Stronger Communities.”   
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It is meaningful that the proposal to restrict conditional sentences came 
before three other proposals that deal with much more serious offenders than 
those who might receive this sanction. 
In 2004, Canada had another federal election. This time the right-of-center 
parties had re-united into the Conservative Party of Canada. Their platform 
document (“Demanding Better”) had a section entitled “Demand Better 
Security.”55 The context of the conditional sentence is telling: “Conditional 
sentences,” which have allowed child sex offenders, murderers, rapists, and 
impaired drivers the opportunity to serve their sentences at home rather than in 
prison, must be eliminated for serious offenders . . . .”56 
Notably, the Conservative party ignored the fact that conditional sentences 
could not be given to those convicted of murder or second time (or subsequent) 
impaired driving precisely because conditional sentences were unavailable for 
anyone who would otherwise be sentenced to two years or more in prison. 
However, we would suggest that it was likely unnecessary to have oversold their 
argument. The party knew that restricting conditional sentences was an easy sell. 
Indeed, the Liberal government—with its bumbling of the conditional 
sentence—unintentionally encouraged the politicization of crime policy. In 
reality, cases of crimes against persons other than common assault accounted for 
only roughly 22% of all conditional sentences in 2004, the year conditional 
sentences accounted for the highest proportion of criminal sentences prior to the 
2006 election.57 Sexual assaults and weapons offenses accounted for 3% and 2%, 
respectively, of all conditional sentences that same year. After the Conservatives 
had implemented their desired changes in 2012 and 2013, with a majority 
government, these proportions changed only slightly. In 2015, crimes against 
persons other than common assault accounted for 18% of conditional sentences, 
with sexual assault accounting for 2% and weapons offenses representing 3%.58 
More importantly, most conditional sentences were not imposed in cases that 
would be of special concern to members of the public. Nevertheless, the Liberals 
handed those interested in capitalizing on allegations of sentence leniency an 
easy electoral issue. Indeed, actual figures on the relative use of the sanction 
overall, or the offenses that accounted for most of conditional sentences, are 
irrelevant if people are unaware of them. 
Perhaps even more telling is that the Liberals, with a minority government in 
2005, introduced yet another amendment to the conditional sentence.59 In 
addition to a few minor wording changes, the government proposed restrictions 
on the use of this sanction for a number of serious and violent offenses—a 
 
 55.  CONSERVATIVE PARTY OF CANADA, DEMANDING BETTER 36 (2004). 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  CANSIM, supra note 1. 
 58.  Id.  
 59.  An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (conditional sentence of imprisonment), 1st Session, 38th 
Parliament  C-70. 
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problem that had plagued it from its birth. Specifically, this proposal stated that 
in deciding whether a conditional sentence should be ordered: 
[T]he court shall not order that an offender serve his or her sentence in the community 
if the offender has been convicted of any of the following offences, unless the court is 
satisfied that it is in the interests of justice to do so because of exceptional circumstances: 
a) a serious personal injury offence . . .  
b) a terrorism offence 
c) a criminal organization offence 
d) an offence in respect of which, on the basis of the nature and circumstances of 
the offence, the expression of society’s denunciation should take precedence 
over any other sentencing objectives. 
If the court orders the offender to serve his or her sentence in the community because 
of exceptional circumstances, the court shall include in the record a statement of those 
circumstances.60 
Had this amendment passed, it probably would have had very little impact 
other than to provide a defense of the conditional sentence when the sanction 
was attacked. One senior Liberal Member of Parliament whom we interviewed 
referred to it as a “tweaking” of the legislation. In any case, thirty-three days after 
its introduction, the minority government fell on a confidence vote. 
However, the floodgates to the politicization of crime had been opened. In 
the election campaign that followed (2006), the Conservatives promised a virtual 
tsunami of “tough-on-crime” legislation in its election platform. Notably, 
amendments to the conditional sentence were the second of fourteen crime 
proposals, the first being a promise to introduce a set of mandatory minimum 
penalties. Specifically, the Conservatives proposed to “[e]nd conditional 
sentences (‘“house arrest’”) for serious crimes, including designated violent and 
sexual offences, weapons offences, major drug offences, crimes committed 
against children, and impaired driving causing death or serious injury.”61 
The priority given to the conditional sentence almost certainly reflected its 
vulnerability to penal populism. Given the public’s longstanding concerns with 
its use (particularly with more serious or violent offenses), attacking it continued 
to be an easy sell. Indeed, the Liberals had provided a ready-made issue for the 
Conservatives to use to sway public opinion. Canadians have long believed that 
sentences for criminal offenses are too lenient. Particularly given its explicit 
purpose of reducing imprisonment by having prison sentences served in the 
community, the conditional sentence had all of the markings of a “soft on crime” 
initiative. 
Unsurprisingly, the Conservative 2006 legislative proposal to reduce the 
availability of conditional sentences was their first post-election crime bill.62 It 
would have barred the use of this sanction for all offenses punishable by ten years 
 
 60.  Id. at 2–3. 
 61.  CONSERVATIVE PARTY OF CANADA, STAND UP FOR CANADA: FEDERAL ELECTION 
PLATFORM 22 (2006).   
 62.  An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Conditional Sentence of Imprisonment), 1st Session, 39th 
Parliament, C-9. 
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or more. Given Canada’s high legislated maximum penalties, this cut-off point 
would have excluded many property offenses, including all break-and-enters, all 
thefts or frauds involving items valued at $5,000 or more, and many other less 
serious crimes. In the end, under pressure from the opposition parties, the 
minority government, which apparently did not expect to be in power for long,63 
eliminated only personal injury, terrorism, or criminal organization offenses with 
maximum sentences of ten years or more from eligibility for the sanction. 
Given that few Canadians likely had any idea of maximum sentences in 
criminal legislation, one would have thought that these new constraints would 
have been sufficient. They were not. In 2009, the Conservative government 
introduced further restrictions that did not make it through Parliament.64 
However, with a parliamentary majority two years later, they passed legislation 
that removed this sentencing option for a substantial number of offenses. 
Specifically, conditional sentences would, thereafter, be available only if the 
various principled exceptions did not apply and: 
(c) the offence is not an offence, prosecuted by way of indictment, for which the 
maximum term of imprisonment is 14 years or life; 
(d) the offence is not a terrorism offence, or a criminal organization offence, prosecuted 
by way of indictment, for which the maximum term of imprisonment is 10 years or more; 
(e) the offence is not an offence, prosecuted by way of indictment, for which the 
maximum term of imprisonment is 10 years, that 
 (i) resulted in bodily harm, 
 (ii) involved the import, export, trafficking or production of drugs, or 
 (iii) involved the use of a weapon; and 
(f) the offence is not an offence, prosecuted by way of indictment, under any of the 
following provisions…. [A list of 11 offences followed including any sexual assault, 
break and enter, and more serious thefts].65 
The Conservative government had, for all intents and purposes, gutted the 
conditional sentence. There is no doubt that these restrictions hit at the heart of 
the cases that were the probable focus of this sanction as it was originally 




The conditional sentence was designed to reduce Canada’s growing 
provincial and territorial prison population. As such, it was expected to be used 
for offenders who would otherwise have received a real prison sentence. Within 
this context, success has generally been defined as a measurable reduction in the 
 
 63.  PAUL WELLS, THE LONGER I’M PRIME MINISTER (2013).   
 64.  40th Parliament, 2nd session, Bill C-42 Ending Conditional Sentences for Property and Other 
Serious Crimes Act (2009). 
 65.  Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 742.1 (Can.).  
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prison population or admissions without any change in other non-prison 
sanctions, such as probation. 
To a large extent, we believe that the empirical question of whether the use 
of prison sentences decreased because of the newly created availability of 
conditional sentences is impossible to answer adequately. First, it was 
implemented simultaneously across the country. As such, there are no 
jurisdictions in which the conditional sentence was unavailable that could act as 
a control group. Second, it was implemented at a time in which there was serious 
pressure to decrease the use of imprisonment by any means. Accordingly, it is 
difficult—if not impossible—to disentangle other contemporaneous changes 
designed to reduce incarceration, including other parts of the same legislation. 
These rival (legislative) explanations would include the requirement that 
sentences be proportional to the harm done and the principle that all available 
sanctions other than imprisonment should be considered for all offenders .66 
Third, both overall and violent crime rates in Canada peaked in the mid-1990s 
and have since declined.67 Predictably, the number of adults charged also 
decreased. Similarly, Canada’s provincial and territorial imprisonment rate 
peaked in 1994 after having risen since the early 1970s; by 2003, it had drifted 
back to its 1987 rate.68 Importantly, this seemingly natural fluctuation over time 
constitutes yet another rival explanation for any drop in levels of incarceration 
attributed to the conditional sentence, which was introduced at a time in which 
imprisonment rates had already started falling. Consistent with this explanation, 
Canada’s federal imprisonment rate also peaked in 1994 and began a similar long-
term decline,69 a phenomenon that parallels the provincial and territorial trends 
but upon which the conditional sentence would have had no impact. 
Fourth, prison admissions were anything but stable across Canadian 
provinces and territories during the early 1990s. Illustratively, the change from 
1990 to 1995 (the period prior to the availability of conditional sentences) varied 
from a 52% decrease in the number of sentenced admissions in Manitoba to a 
62% increase in British Columbia.70 However, any empirical analysis that 
compares the pre- versus post-periods largely assumes stability within at least the 
pre-period. Where prison figures prior to the availability of the sanction are 
unstable, it is plausible to explain any changes between pre- and post-rates as 
being the result of either a) pre-existing trends in some provinces if rates were 
already decreasing, or b) regression to pre-existing rates in others. More simply, 
any post-1996 drop in imprisonment levels may merely reflect already declining 
rates prior to 1996 or, conversely, a natural return to normal rates following 
unusually high levels before 1996. 
 
 66.  Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 718.2(e) (Can.). 
 67.  Anthony N. Doob & Cheryl M. Webster, Weathering the Storm? Testing Long-Standing 
Canadian Sentencing Policy in the Twenty-First Century, 45 CRIME & JUST. 359 (2016), Fig 2. 
 68.  See id. 
 69.  See id. 
 70.  CANSIM, supra note 1. 
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In brief, numerous competing explanations exist for any apparent drop in 
imprisonment following the introduction of the conditional sentence. Given the 
significant difficulties in ruling them out as explanatory factors, we would suggest 
that strong conclusions regarding the decarceration effects of the new sanction 
are inappropriate. But the question of whether the conditional sentence was 
successful in reducing imprisonment in Canada is probably a silly one. Obviously, 
some offenders received a conditional sentence who otherwise would have been 
handed down a custodial sanction. As such, the empirical point at issue should 
not be whether the conditional sentence reduced imprisonment very slightly. 
Rather, it is whether its availability had an important impact on incarceration 
rates. 
A. Prior Research 
Unfortunately, few empirical studies have examined this more restricted 
question. The most sophisticated attempt to-date is arguably the study conducted 
by Roberts and Gabor71 and expanded by Roberts.72 Comparing the four years 
prior to and following the availability of the conditional sentence, these scholars 
found a reduction in the rate per 10,000 adults charged (not sentenced) who 
received custodial sentences in eight of the nine jurisdictions for which they 
obtained data, with an aggregate decrease of 13%.73 Further, they found a 
negative correlation (r=-.45) between changes in the custody rate across 
jurisdictions and the volume of conditional sentences imposed.74 That is, as the 
number of conditional sentences increased, the custody rate (per 10,000 adults 
charged) decreased. 
On their own, these results suggest—as the authors claim—a decarceration 
effect from the introduction of conditional sentences. The difficulty is ruling out 
alternative explanations for this drop. Indeed, there was a great deal of volatility 
during the period under analysis: declining crime rates, decreasing numbers of 
adults being charged, considerable instability in prison admissions during the 
years leading up to the enactment of this sanction, and explicit directives to 
judges to reduce their recourse to imprisonment by using all other available 
sanctions. Any of these factors could arguably constitute a rival explanation. To 
their credit, Roberts and Gabor acknowledge that “a considerable proportion of 
the drop in custody rates is explained by variables other than the introduction of 
conditional sentencing.”75 
As another illustration of the problem, one might note the co-existing trends 
in the remand rate—a phenomenon which only became salient years after the 
publication of this study. Figure 3 demonstrates this concern. 
 
 71.   Julian V. Roberts & T. Gabor, Living in the Shadow of Prison, 44 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 92 
(2004)  
 72.   ROBERTS, THE VIRTUAL PRISON, supra note 16. 
 73.  Roberts & Gabor, supra note 71, at 100. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Id. 
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Figure 3: Canadian Provincial Prison Rate (per 100,000 residents) (1978-2014)76 
 
While the provincial sentenced population shows a steady decline over time—
most pronounced between the early 1990s and the mid-2000s—the remand 
population in Canada displays an increase over this same period. By 2005, it was 
well established that the growth in the remand population, composed largely of 
those awaiting trial—though including a few awaiting sentencing—was a serious 
problem. In fact, the long-term upward trend in the remand population overtook 
the sentenced population in 2005. The intersection of these two sub-groups of 
provincial prisoners in 2004 would suggest compensation at sentencing with 
credit off the sentence being given for time served in pretrial custody. 
Consequently, prison sentenced admissions would necessarily be reduced given 
some offenders would have served their entire custodial sentence before being 
sentenced. Similarly, sentenced prison counts would decrease as sentences 
became fewer or shorter because of pretrial credits. 
Within this context, the growth in the pretrial detention population during 
the period examined by Roberts and Gabor77 represents yet another compelling 
explanation for any drop in provincial sentenced imprisonment. When coupled 
with other equally relevant alternative explanations previously presented, the 
notion that one can convincingly assess the effects of the new sanction on 
imprisonment is dubious. While there are almost certainly cases in which 
 
 76.  CANSIM, supra note 1. 
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offenders were given conditional sentences in place of custodial sanctions, there 
is no measurable impact. On the one hand, Roberts and Gabor’s interpretation 
of the 13% drop in the aggregate rates of sentenced admissions to custody78 is 
plagued by the inability to isolate the effect of the new sanction from that of so 
many other competing, and arguably more plausible, factors, such as the 
increased credit being given for time in pretrial custody. On the other hand, while 
their correlation between the change in the custody rate and the rate at which the 
new sanction was used is in the predicted negative direction, it does not even 
approach traditional standards of statistical significance (r=-.45, df=7, p=.227) 
and is best interpreted as such.79 
B. Additional Analyses 
Perhaps because of the multiple competing explanations for changes in 
sentencing patterns, almost no subsequent empirical analyses have been 
conducted on the effects of the conditional sentence in the past two decades. Our 
own attempt yields no real advances in overcoming the initial inherent 
difficulties. Our only advantage from previous studies is that we benefit from the 
passage of time—both in terms of access to more extensive longitudinal data and 
subsequent changes to the conditional sentence that might provide another 
vantage point in examining its impact. In brief, there continues to be no 
compelling evidence to suggest that the conditional sentence has had any 
measurable impact on provincial and territorial sentenced imprisonment. The 
arguments upon which we base this conclusion are twofold. 
1. Use of the Conditional Sentence 
Conditional sentences have played a small role in sentencing options. Table 
1 examines the distribution of the most serious sentence handed down in 
Canadian criminal courts. 
 
 78.  Id. at 100. 
 79.  Id. 
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Table 1: Most Serious Component of Sentence (Canada, reporting jurisdictions)80 
 
As a snapshot of the overall use of the conditional sentence, we have chosen 
to examine sentencing data from 2006 and 2015. This choice is purposeful. The 
data from the first year represents a period in the life of this sanction before any 
of the legislated restrictions on its use. In contrast, the latter year constitutes a 
period subsequent to the enactment of the various restrictive provisions. Notably, 
even before Parliament limited the scope of the conditional sentence, it was only 
used in 4.2% of all criminal cases in which the offender was found guilty and 
sentenced. This proportion fell slightly to 3.6% in 2015. Clearly, it has never been 
a significant tool in the hands of sentencing judges. 
However, its use varied across jurisdictions. Table 2 displays the breakdown 
of the most serious component of the sentence for all cases with “guilty” as the 
most serious decision. Data are presented from the six largest provinces that had 
data on the imposition of conditional sentences at sentencing. Expanding on 
Table 1, we present data for three different periods: before any of the restrictions 
were introduced (labelled as “early”), 2007 (the cusp of the initial legislative 
changes which received royal assent on May 31, 2007), and 2015 (the culmination 
of the various restrictions, the last coming into force on March 13, 2012). 
  
 
 80.  CANSIM, supra note 1. 
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Table 2: The Relative Importance of Conditional Sentences (as the most serious 
component of the sentence) at Sentencing (reference years in parentheses)81 
Note: Different reference years are used for “early” because of unavailability of 
data. 
 
Most notably, the proportion of guilty cases handed down a conditional 
sentence was not large in any of the jurisdictions, for any period. Indeed, it is 
dwarfed by both custody and probation (not shown) in all six provinces. Nor was 
its use uniform. The conditional sentence appears to have been used the least 
frequently in Alberta (never exceeding 2.2%) and the most frequently in Nova 
Scotia (representing almost 9% of cases in 2007 and 2015). 
Similarly, its use varied by offense type. Table 3 presents annual data for 
Ontario—Canada’s largest province, representing approximately 40% of all 
criminal cases. The proportion of all sentenced offenders receiving custody and 
conditional sentences for all offenses are displayed and subsequently broken 
down by various offense categories. 
  
 
 81.  CANSIM, supra note 1. 
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Table 3: Percentage of All Sentenced Offenders Receiving Custody and 
Conditional Sentences by Offense Type (Ontario)82 
Notes: (1) There are differences between some of the figures in this table and 
those in Table 2 that are inconsequential (max difference=0.2%), relating to 
minor discrepancies in the numbers taken from different Statistics Canada tables. 
(2) For inexplicable reasons, recorded drug offenses dropped dramatically in 
2003 but custody and conditional sentences did not drop substantially (2002 
cases=4250; 2003, cases=1930; 2004, cases=3442). Caution is warranted for 2003 
data. 
 
Of the four offense types presented, conditional sentences were used 
considerably more frequently for drug offenses than for violent, property, or 
administration of justice offenses. While the proportion of sentenced drug 
offenders receiving this sanction often exceeded 20% over this eighteen-year 
period, it barely reached 7% for any of the other offense types. However, given 
that drug offenses typically represent less than 9% of all cases being sentenced, 
even this targeted use of the conditional sentence represents few cases in the 
overall scheme. 
 
 82.  CANSIM, supra note 1. 
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Beyond giving a general picture of the use of this sanction, these sentencing 
data in Table 3 also allow us to explore the impact of the various restrictions 
legislated under the previous Conservative government. Specifically, we are 
looking for discontinuity—that is, change in the direction or magnitude of the use 
of the conditional sentence following legislated restrictions. In terms of the initial 
legislative changes (mid-2007), there appears to be very little evidence of an 
effect. In fact, there were some increases (rather than a predicted decrease) when 
comparing the years immediately prior to and following this amendment. 
In contrast, the 2012 legislative restrictions appear to have had a slightly more 
discernible impact. With the exception of administration of justice offenses, 
which showed a very slight increase, all of the other categories seemingly 
witnessed a decline in the proportion of sentenced offenders receiving 
conditional sentences. Having said this, only drug offenses showed any 
substantial change in the use of this sanction. Indeed, it would appear—at least 
in terms of these Ontario data—that the conditional sentence never accounted 
for a large portion of sentences in any period, especially compared to normal 
custody and probation. 
This observation also appears to find support more broadly.83 While there was 
an increase in the proportion of guilty cases handed down a conditional sentence 
between the early period and 2007 for five of the six jurisdictions, there was a 
decrease between 2007 and 2015 in four of them. However, with the exception of 
British Columbia (which dropped from 7.5% to 5.8%), the declines were small. 
For the two other provinces, there was no change. Particularly given that the 2012 
restrictions hit at the heart of the cases that were the focus of the conditional 
sentence, the lack of substantial impact further suggests that this sanction has 
never played a large role at sentencing. 
2. Effectiveness in Reducing Imprisonment 
Even though the conditional sentence was rarely used, this description does 
not necessarily mean that it was ineffective in reducing imprisonment. However, 
the picture painted in Table 3 is not encouraging. There appears to be no obvious 
discontinuity in the proportion of sentenced offenders receiving custody in 
Ontario over this period. Most notably, one cannot find evidence (with the 
possible exception of drug offenses) that the proportion of offenders sentenced 
to custody dropped noticeably with the introduction of this sanction in 1996. 
Similarly, one would have anticipated increases in the custody percentages 
following the introduction of the various restrictions on conditional sentencing. 
There is very little evidence of this phenomenon either. One would be tempted 
to conclude that the conditional sentence of imprisonment did nothing 
substantial to reduce incarceration. This ineffectiveness was likely a reflection—
at least in part—of the fact that it accounted for only a small portion of sentences. 
 
 83.  See supra Table 2. 
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The data in Table 2 appear to confirm this lack of effect. Given that the initial 
restrictions only came into force for offenses committed after mid-2007, the 
percentage of guilty cases given a custodial sentence should have dropped 
between the early years of the conditional sentence and 2007. Indeed, this 
sanction had been in force for approximately ten years. In Manitoba and 
Saskatchewan, the proportions were stable but not declining. Otherwise, they 
increased in the other four jurisdictions. 
In contrast, the percentage of custody should have increased between 2007 
and 2015. In 2015 both sets of restrictions on the use of the conditional sentence 
were in full force. In this case, there were changes in the predicted direction. In 
five of the provinces, the proportion of guilty cases given a custodial sentence 
increased. Further, the upturn is non-trivial. In only Ontario and Nova Scotia 
were there either no changes or only very small increases. While the introduction 
of the conditional sentence seemingly had no measurable impact in reducing 
imprisonment, its de facto elimination appears to have increased incarceration. 
In sum, the trends in sentencing data do not provide compelling evidence of 
the effectiveness of this sanction in fulfilling one of its central objectives: reducing 
the use of imprisonment in Canada. However, one might argue that correctional 
data are more appropriate. As conditional sentences were designed explicitly to 
substitute custodial sanctions, this second data source might be better situated—
empirically speaking—to examine this sanction’s direct effect on the Canadian 
prison population. 
Yet they are not without their own limitations. As already discussed, one must 
be particularly attentive to the problem of the remand population as a 
confounding factor. As the pretrial detention population was increasing in many 
provinces over this period, those sentenced to “imprisonment” would get credit 
for time served. Hence, fewer people were going into prison as sentenced 
prisoners given that they would have served their custodial sanction (or at least a 
substantial part of it) before being convicted, rendering them no longer eligible 
for a prison sentence. Further, one must also recognize the difficulties in equating 
prison counts with conditional sentence counts. After the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Proulx, it would be expected that conditional sentences would often 
be longer than the prison sentence that it was replacing. Moreover, those serving 
sentences of less than two years in an actual provincial or territorial prison 
typically earn remission for a total of one third of their sentences.84 
With these caveats in mind, Table 4 presents both correctional counts (the 
average number of prisoners in provincial and territorial prisons on any given 
day) and admissions data (the total number of prisoners admitted to provincial 
prisons in a given year) for Canada as a whole. The numbers are expressed as 




 84.  Prisons and Reformatories Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-20, s. 6(1).  
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Table 4: Provincial and Territorial Correctional Counts and Admissions Data 
(Rates per 100,000 population)85 
Notes: (1) 1997 for conditional sentence counts and admissions. (2) Nova Scotia, 
New Brunswick, Northwest Territories and Nunavut are excluded because of 
completely missing or substantially missing data. (3) Alberta is excluded because 
of missing data. 
 
Most immediately, the conditional sentence correctional counts (column 1) 
appear very large, particularly when compared with the sentenced counts 
(column 2). However, this difference is not a reflection of their frequent use. 
Rather, it is simply a consequence of the lack of direct comparability of the two 
measures. Not only are conditional sentences expected to be longer than their 
custodial counterpart, but they do not benefit from reductions stemming from 
remission, temporary absences, and parole. 
If one were looking for the strongest evidence in favor of the conditional 
sentence reducing imprisonment, one would likely point to rows 2 and 3. 
Following the introduction of this sanction in 1996, conditional sentence counts 
increased by a rate of 9.3 per 100,000 (24.9 to 34.2). This growth was associated 
with a corresponding decrease in the sentenced counts which dropped by a rate 
of 12.9 (48.6 to 35.7). Even considering rising remand rates (of 6.2 from 18.0 to 
24.2), this increase would not account for all of the reduction in sentenced counts. 
In fact, it would seem that even subtracting out the impact of remand, the actual 
reduction in sentenced counts of 6.7 (12.9 to 6.2) between 1995 and 2000 can be 
largely explained by the 9.3 increase in the use of conditional sentences. The 
difference (between 6.7 and 9.3) could arguably reflect some net-widening (the 
use of conditional sentences for offenders who would have otherwise received a 
non-custodial sanction). 
However, the problem with this interpretation is twofold. First, it ignores 
other plausible explanations for the drop in the sentenced counts. For instance, 
violent crime rates were falling and fewer people were being charged over this 
same period. Even more persuasive, imprisonment rates were likely dropping 
naturally at this point after peaking in 1994 through regression toward the mean. 
 
 85.  CANSIM, supra note 1. 
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Second, the suggestion that these data demonstrate the effectiveness of the 
conditional sentence in reducing correctional counts ignores other data. Using 
the same logic and time period as above but applied to the admissions data, the 
same conclusion is more difficult to draw. Even controlling for the 46.2 increase 
per 100,000 in the remand rate (368.3 to 414.5) by subtracting it out from the 115.9 
drop in the rate of sentenced admissions (362.2 minus246.3), we are still left with 
a decrease of 69.7 in sentenced admissions. Such a reduction cannot be attributed 
to conditional sentences as their rate only rose by 6.8 (49.6 to 56.4). Clearly, other 
factors were at play. 
Similarly, one might point to the drop in the rate of conditional sentence 
counts between 2005 and 2010 (43.2 to 39.9). This reduction of 3.3 per 100,000 
would seem to account for the 2.5 increase (29.6 to 32.1) in the rate of sentenced 
counts. That is, until one recalls that the remand counts increased by 4.2 (34.3 to 
38.5), which would likely explain the entire drop in sentenced rates. 
Alternatively, one can compare the substantial drop in the rate of conditional 
sentence counts between 2010 and 2015 (39.9 to 24.8) to the mere 3.9 reduction 
in the rate of sentenced counts (32.1 to 28.2) over the same period. Beyond the 
fact that a reduction in conditional sentence counts should have caused an 
increase in the sentenced counts, the decrease in the sentenced counts is more 
likely explained by the 3.1 increase in the remand counts (38.5 to 41.6). 
As one final illustration of the problems in demonstrating any measurable 
impact of conditional sentences on imprisonment rates, Table 5 presents data on 
the average daily provincial correctional population for Canada’s four largest 
provinces—representing 86% of the Canadian general population.86 
 
 86.  Note that Quebec, Canada’s second largest jurisdiction, was not included in Table 2 due to the 
unavailability of relevant data.  
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Table 5: Proportion of Provincial Correctional Population Serving a Conditional 
Sentence87 
 
This table shows the proportion of the correctional population, which 
includes both those in custody and in the community, that is serving a conditional 
sentence. Most obviously, the percentage rose in all four jurisdictions with the 
introduction of conditional sentences in 1996. Further, the increase was non-
trivial in three of the four provinces. Using British Columbia as an example, 
almost 14% of the provincial correctional population were serving conditional 
sentences in 2005. Indeed, these data appear encouraging in terms of the use of 
this sanction as well as its potential impact on imprisonment.  
That is, until we compare them with the average daily provincial correctional 
population who were serving their sentence in the community (Table 6). 
 
 87.  CANSIM, supra note 1. 
163 - WEBSTER DOOB - MISSED OPPORTUNITIES (DO NOT DELETE) 2/28/2019  2:27 PM 
No. 1 2019] MISSED OPPORTUNITIES 191 
Table 6: Proportion of Provincial Correctional Population Serving Sentence in 
the Community88 
 
If conditional sentences were actually replacing custodial sanctions, we 
should see an increase in the percentage of those serving their sentence in the 
community. However, this does not appear to be the case for three of the four 
provinces. The proportion in the community remained virtually unchanged in 
Ontario and Quebec between 1995 (pre-conditional sentence) and 2005 (almost 
a decade after conditional sentences were introduced but before any restrictions). 
In British Columbia, the percentage actually decreased. While there was a 13.6% 
increase in the provincial correctional population in this jurisdiction that was 
serving a conditional sentence between 1995 and 2005 (Table 5), the proportion 
of this same correctional population serving sentence in the community actually 
fell over the same period. 
This phenomenon would seem to support a net-widening explanation. In fact, 
net-widening becomes even more plausible when one recalls that conditional 
sentences should have automatically increased the proportion of the correctional 
population serving sentence in the community by virtue of not only adding to this 
population (by replacing otherwise custodial sentences), but also because this 
sanction was likely longer than the corresponding prison sanction and prisoners 
serve every day of it. 
Equally notable, Alberta is the only province that saw an increase in the 
proportion of its correctional population serving sentence in the community 
between 1995 and 2005. However, while 11.7% of this jurisdiction’s correctional 
population was serving a conditional sentence in 2005 (Table 5), we see only a 
4.4% increase (from 75% to 79.4%) in the percentage of this population serving 
sentence in the community. Nonetheless, one might still argue that the 
 
 88.  CANSIM, supra note 1. 
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conditional sentence had been at least partially effective in reducing 
imprisonment in this province (although the majority of the increase in the 
proportion of the correctional population serving sentence in the community 
would appear to come from net-widening). Yet even this suggestion overlooks 
the fact that this increase in the community correctional population occurred 
during a period in which other factors very clearly account for a large (32%) 
reduction in this province’s prison population.89 This reduction in the prison 
portion of the provincial correctional population, and consequential increase in 
the community component, provides a compelling alternative explanation for the 
increase in the percentage of the correctional population serving a sentence in 
the community. This account has little to do with the use of conditional sentences 
in lieu of custodial sanctions. 
Beyond reaffirming the lack of a consistent, measurable decarceration effect 
of the conditional sentence, Tables 5 and 6 also reinforce the impact of the 
Conservative government’s restrictions on this sanction. Between 2005 (before 
any of the legislative constraints were introduced) and 2015, the proportion of 
the provincial correctional population that was serving a conditional sentence 
decreased; furthermore, the proportion serving sentences in the community also 
dropped.90 It appears possible that the functional removal of the conditional 
sentence may have created a void that was ultimately filled by prison. 
V 
FORESEEABLE CHALLENGES: UNFORESEEABLE CONSEQUENCES 
The story of Canada’s conditional sentence might be best summarized as one 
of missed opportunities. In contrast to other nations that, by 1996, had already 
embarked on—in some cases dramatic—prison expansion, Canadian criminal 
law and formal statements of criminal justice policy addressing the issue of 
criminal sanctions continued to reflect a longstanding culture of restraint in the 
use of imprisonment and a deep skepticism about prison as an appropriate 
response to crime.91 Within this context, the introduction of conditional sentences 
would have been seen as entirely fitting. There was no reason to believe that the 
door was not open to yet another strategy to reduce incarceration. 
Unfortunately, the Canadian government stumbled through this criminal 
justice policy door. The legislative form of this new sanction was markedly flawed 
from the start. Most obviously, the bill introduced into Parliament lacked careful 
and thoughtful drafting. In addition, it is our understanding from private 
 
 89.  Cheryl M. Webster & Anthony N. Doob, Penal Reform ‘Canadian Style:’ Fiscal Responsibility 
and Decarceration in Alberta, Canada, 16 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y, no. 1 (2014), at 3–31 (discussing, most 
notably, that the Premier of this province slashed the Justice Ministry’s budget by 20%. In response, one 
prison was closed, police became more selective in whom they charged, prosecutors were more selective 
in whom they took through the criminal process, and judges became more selective in whom they 
sentenced to prison). 
 90.  See Tables 5 and 6. 
 91.  Webster & Doob, supra note 5; Webster & Doob, supra note 7.  
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discussions that there was little to no consultation prior to introducing it. Further, 
the Parliamentary process failed to conduct meaningful discussion and debate. 
As a result, changes were needed almost immediately. In fact, the law was 
amended four times, damaging its credibility and, more broadly, its legitimacy in 
the eyes of judges and Canadians generally. 
But the law was also naïve. It seemingly failed to recognize—and, more 
importantly, address—the foreseeable public concerns surrounding this criminal 
sanction as being too lenient. Indeed, it had all of the characteristics of a “soft on 
crime” initiative, beginning with the apparent contradiction of terms in its very 
name. Although Roberts, Antonowicz, and Sanders92 have demonstrated that 
people who are given adequate information about conditional sentences are 
much more likely to accept them as legitimate, those responsible for introducing 
it were seemingly unconcerned with educating the public about what the sanction 
could entail—particularly its more punitive elements. Predictably, not only did 
the public generally dislike the conditional sentence, but disfavor was most acute 
among those who already thought that Canadian sentences were too lenient.93 
The political process was no better at selling the conditional sentence as a 
legitimate sanction. Less than a year after it became available, a general election 
was called. In its 1997 election platform, the Liberal Party suggested that 
Minor, first-time offenders should be treated differently than serious, violent offenders.  
We have made changes to sentencing laws to encourage courts to distinguish between 
serious, violent crime requiring prison time and less serious, non-violent crime that can 
be handled more effectively in the community. A new Liberal government will propose 
alternatives to incarceration for low-risk, non-violent offenders . . . .94 
Notably, there was no mention of “conditional sentences” by name or 
description. The direct link between this sanction and less serious and non-violent 
crimes likely would have gone a long way in educating the public about its role 
and value, as well as dispelling fears of inappropriate leniency. Similarly, despite 
Supreme Court intervention in Proulx in 2000, there continued to be no explicit 
mention of the assumption of harsher conditions, such as house arrest as part of 
this sanction. Rather, there was simply reference to community service, which is 
not necessarily seen as punitive. 
Regrettably, there was also little training provided to judges, particularly in 
terms of the scope of the conditional sentence, as well as the initial perplexing 
methodology of how to devise a proportionate sentence in the community that 
was the same length as the custodial sanction that it was intended to replace. 
More broadly, while this sanction was well motivated by principled concerns 
about the overuse of incarceration, the government was apparently unwilling to 
make the difficult decisions to ensure its success. That is, the legislation was not 
written in a way that would accomplish decarceration. Rather, the language was 
merely aspirational rather than prescriptive or even presumptive, and there were 
 
 92.  Roberts, Antonowicz, & Sanders, supra note 29. 
 93.  Marinos & Doob, supra note 49. 
 94.  LIBERAL PARTY OF CANADA, SECURING OUR FUTURE TOGETHER (1997). 
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no explicit guidelines or hurdles that would address the underlying principled 
issues surrounding the scope of the legislation.95 Indeed, the law contained no 
mechanisms to limit its misuse in either direction: net-widening or using it for 
cases of serious violence without—at the very least—requiring that judges 
provide written justification for exceptional circumstances. Simply put, the 
government chose not to make policy. 
Perhaps the only opportunity not missed was taken by the Conservatives to 
use this sanction for political purposes. Indeed, the Conservative government 
capitalized on the public’s concerns with the overly lenient conditional sentence, 
campaigning on dramatically restricting its use. As nothing systematic had been 
done to explain to the public the nature of the sanction when it was actually being 
used, there were very few defenders of it by the time the Conservatives began 
dismantling it. 
Had the story of Canada’s experience with conditional sentences ended here, 
it would have been a disappointing and unfortunate—even if foreseeable—tale. 
This sanction was never a significant player in the sentencing game. Further, it 
did not seemingly achieve any measurable reduction in Canada’s imprisonment 
rate. In fact, it appears to have been used with cases that would otherwise have 
received a suspended sentence. In brief, one would be hard-pressed to consider 
it a success on any dimension. 
But the story may also have an unexpected twist. In light of the pessimistic 
findings, one might naturally assume that its de facto demise—brought about by 
the Conservative government’s restrictions—would have simply translated into a 
return to pre-1996 sentencing practices. As it turns out, this assumption might not 
be true. In fact, two new phenomena may be emerging. 
First, it is notable that while introducing a new sanction into the mix of 
community sanctions may not have reduced imprisonment, taking it away may 
have increased incarceration.96 At first blush, the post-2012 rise in the use of 
prison would be expected as conditional sentences—intended to replace 
custodial sanctions—had been eliminated for a substantial number of eligible 
offenses. However, even during the supposed heyday of this sanction, there was 
no real decrease in imprisonment. Rather, cases never in jeopardy of custodial 
sanctions were seemingly being upgraded to conditional sentences. In fact, 
Gemmell had already warned of the temptation of net-widening as judges would 
see this sanction as a more robust probation order with a built-in pre-set penalty 
for failures. 97 
Alternatively, the removal of this sanction may have left a void that has 
potentially been filled by prison. Rather than return to suspended sentences for 
 
 95.  For example, even after the Supreme Court of Canada specifically interpreted the legislation as 
permitting the duration of a conditional sentence to be longer than the prison sentence that it replaced, 
the law was never changed to reflect this change, nor has it ever specifically included a reference to house 
arrest or other explicitly punitive conditions other than community service.  
 96.  See supra Table 2. 
 97.  Gemmell, supra note 31.  
163 - WEBSTER DOOB - MISSED OPPORTUNITIES (DO NOT DELETE) 2/28/2019  2:27 PM 
No. 1 2019] MISSED OPPORTUNITIES 195 
cases which had been previously “up-tariffed” to conditional sentences, some 
judges may have simply upgraded them to prison. That is, the legislative 
restrictions on this sanction may have ironically increased the use of 
imprisonment for cases that, twenty years earlier, would have received an 
ordinary community sanction. While speculative, this scenario is not implausible. 
More difficult might be trying to explain it. Some might be tempted to suggest 
that the threshold to custody has simply been lowered whereby Canadian judges 
are more willing to use incarceration. While leaving this discussion for another 
time, we might simply suggest that such an explanation seemingly flies in the face 
of Canada’s long-standing belief in restraint in the use of imprisonment and the 
Canadian judiciary’s resistance—particularly during the recent Conservative 
government’s reign—to tough-on-crime policies.98 
Second—and perhaps as the other face of the same coin—new suspended 
sentences have appeared, albeit largely in exceptional circumstances. Thoughtful 
judges, we believe, sometimes tried to craft conditional sentences as serious 
attempts to avoid imprisonment for certain offenders where prison could have 
serious harmful effects. When they were, or became, unavailable, but prison still 
appeared to be the expected sanction as mandated by the relevant Court of 
Appeal, the judge was left in an awkward position of how to sentence an offender 
when prison is the anticipated sanction but would be inappropriate for various 
reasons. 
For decades, Canada’s Criminal Code has contained the possibility of 
suspending the passing of a sentence and placing the offender on probation. 
Normally this sanction is thought of as a simple probation sentence, and the 
suspended sentence does not receive any real attention. That is, although 
someone legally receives a “suspended sentence and probation,” in reality, it is 
the probation part of it that is the focus. 
More recently, some judges have started taking seriously the possibility that 
they might suspend the passing of sentence by placing the offender on probation 
and making it clear that any violation of the terms of probation would trigger 
their re-sentencing for the original offense and that such a re-sentence will almost 
certainly involve imprisonment. In this way, suspended sentences are being 
rendered more punitive, particularly with the addition of more restrictive 
conditions attached to them (such as house arrest and electronic monitoring). An 
attentive reader will certainly note that this harsher suspended sentence bears 
substantial similarities to the conditional sentence. 
Notably, several recent cases have adopted this approach. In one Ontario 
case, the judge was barred from imposing a conditional sentence for trafficking 
in cocaine because of the 2012 legislated restrictions.99 In a 46-page judgment, 
Justice Green concluded that a non-custodial sentence would be appropriate in 
this particular circumstance—a sentence he, himself, described as “rare, if not 
 
 98.  Doob & Webster, supra note 67. 
 99.  R. v. McGill, [2016] ONCJ 138. (Can.),  
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unprecedented” for this offense.100 But in doing so, he reminded readers that with 
suspended sentences, the judge was suspending the sentencing of a convicted 
offender and could, if circumstances were appropriate, re-sentence the person to 
a custodial term, much like what happens if a person were to breach a conditional 
sentence order. 
In these cases, it would appear that we have come full circle. Specifically, a 
traditional suspended sentence is being imposed where, for more than a decade, 
a conditional sentence of imprisonment might have been appropriate. Judges 
have simply transformed—in a certain sense—the way in which the suspended 
sentence and probation has traditionally been conceptualized and imposed. 
Rather than being seen primarily as a rehabilitative sanction, it has been given a 
more punitive bite—precisely the same bite that the conditional sentence was 
meant to have. Some have considered this type of supposedly creative sentencing 
a work-around, arguably undermining the legislative intent.101 We suggest that it 
leads one to legitimately question whether conditional sentences were ever 
needed in the first place. 
If there is a moral to this story, the Canadian experience with conditional 
sentencing suggests that for those serious about reducing imprisonment, this 
sanction likely is not the solution. At best, it might be useful in chipping away at 
incarceration, but even then, in no measurable way. To be effective, there must 
be a demonstrable need for a new sanction, and even then, it is fundamental to 
identify what the specific need is and subsequently target the sanction to address 
it. Simply adding alternatives to incarceration is insufficient, particularly if they 
are crafted without sufficient guidance and training, as well as sensitivity to 
natural public concerns with leniency. 
But once again, context matters. While the introduction of the conditional 
sentence is likely to be interpreted as a failure by most Canadians, a broader 
perspective might provide some solace. On the one hand, this sentencing 
experiment might arguably be seen as a “failure in the right direction.” It was 
borne out of concern with rising imprisonment rates and was firmly embedded 
within a long-standing belief in restraint in the use of incarceration. Certainly 
when contrasted with the United States, our closest neighbor, any serious, 
principled, and rational search for alternatives to prison is arguably a laudable 
endeavour. 
On the other hand, the Canadian experience with conditional sentences might 
also be interpreted as an inescapable failure. That is, the various causes of our 
lack of success may not be Canadian in origin. Rather, our failure may reflect 
broader problems with intermediate sentences generally. As others have argued 
 
 100.  Like Justice Green, we are not suggesting that the approach in this case is as common as 
conditional sentences might have been. However, it is interesting that this approach has been followed 
elsewhere. R. v. Sellars, [2017] B.C.S.C. 2236. (Can.). See also a series of cases considered by the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal in which suspended sentences were used for ‘dial-a-dope’ trafficking charges 
for which conditional sentences are no longer available. R. v. Voong, [2015] 374 B.C.A.C. 166. (Can.).  
 101.  North, supra note 17. 
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before us,102 penal equivalence is not rooted exclusively in quantitative 
(proportionate or retributive) questions of severity but is also a function of more 
qualitative (expressive) questions of sentencing goals. Simply put, even especially 
onerous conditional sentences may fail to express the public’s condemnation as 
dramatically or unequivocally as a prison sentence. For certain offenses (and 
likely certain offenders), punishment is simply synonymous with imprisonment. 
While the Canadian Parliament inadvertently muddied the waters even more, 
the logic or rationale for conditional sentences as a viable sanction between 
custody and probation is inherently murky. Even in a nation whose cores values 
are arguably more communitarian, less violent, and more compassionate in 
nature than those of other comparable countries,103 this sanction may simply be 
unable—in most cases—to capture our punitive imagination. In the end, and as 
we have argued elsewhere,104 the most effective strategy to bring about 
decarceration continues to be rooted in finding ways of creating a moral change 
whereby prison is seen as a “Bad Thing.”105 And at that point, new sanctions may 









 102.  See e.g., Voula Marinos, Thinking About Penal Equivalents, 7 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y, no. 4, 441–
55 (2005); see generally Arie Freiberg, Affective Versus Effective Justice: Instrumentalism and 
Emotionalism in Criminal Justice, 3 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y, no. 2 (2001), at 265–78.  
 103.  Webster & Doob, supra note 7. 
 104.  Anthony N. Doob & Cheryl M. Webster, Creating the Will to Change, 13 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. 
POL’Y, no. 4 (2014).  
 105.  Michael Tonry, Making American Sentencing Just, Humane, and Effective, 46 CRIME & JUST., 
no. 1 (2017), at 441–504. 
